Liking and power as factors affecting coalition choices in the triad

The effects of resource capability and interpersonal attraction on coalition behavior were studied. Power was distributed the same way in all triads (A = 4, B = 3, C = 2). Male and female participants were asked to play the role of B and were distributed across 3 experimental conditions: (1) no additional information was provided; (2) participants were informed that A and B had similar attitudes and that C had dissimilar attitudes; or (3) participants were informed that B and C had similar attitudes and that A had dissimilar attitudes. Participants were asked to select a coalition partner, predict which coalition would form, and estimate how the winnings would be distributed between coalition partners. Males chose A and C equally often in all experimental conditions, but most frequently predicted that the B-C coalition would form and estimated that winnings would be distributed by a norm of equity. In contrast, females chose the liked person as a coalition partner, predicted that attracted persons would form coalitions, and estimated that winnings would be distributed according to a norm of equality. The implications of the results for game, minimum power, and relational theories of coalition behavior are discussed.